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Going Concern Audit Opinions:  Good News for Corporate Insiders? 
We report that corporate insiders are able to profit from conservative first time going concern 
audit opinions (GCOs).  GCOs comprise a high percentage of Type I error that transforms into 
a going concern opinion withdrawal (GCOW) within one year.  We conjecture and affirm that 
the anticipatory trading of corporate insiders, who have access to firm based private information, 
drives positive abnormal returns before a GCOW and this increased trading volume is 
associated with firms that have audit determined financial issues. The degree of economic 
significance is highlighted by constructing arbitrage hedge portfolios that follow the trading of 
all corporate insiders in GCOW firms, by returning abnormal profits of 25.36% over 60 days.   
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1. Introduction 
Audit opinions arise from an external audit after examination of an organization’s financial reports 
and operations by a professional and independent accounting firm.  One of the most important is the 
going concern audit opinion (GCO) which highlights negative information to investors. 1   The 
economic importance of a GCO derives from the fact that it is the only modified audit opinion 
accepted in public company filings by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and it contains 
information about financial difficulties that gave rise to the GCO (Defond and Zhang, 2014).  
Consequently, the negative news of a GCO is more often associated with substantial negative market 
reactions—both in the short-term (Fleak and Wilson 1994; Carlson et al. 1998; Menon and Williams 
2010) and in the longer-term (Taffler et al. 2004; Kausar et al. 2009). 
Whilst the general market reaction to GCO’s is negative and firms subsequently fail, they can be 
polluted with opinions that are subsequently reversed within short periods (Type I error), with prior 
research reporting substantial Type I error contained in the opinion (Hopwood et al. 1989; 
Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Foster et al., 1998; Lennox, 1999; Geiger and Rama, 2006; Kausar et 
al., 2009; Menon and Williams, 2010; Myers et al., 2016).  For example, Francis and Krishnan (2002) 
document 80.38% Type I error by Big Six auditors in the US, Kausar et al. (2009) show that 16% of 
first-time GCO firms in their full sample receive a going concern opinion withdrawal (GCOW) within 
one year, and Carson et al. (2013) report 98.31% of GCO firms subsequently survive, based on 88,359 
US firm-year observations over the period of 2000 to 2010.  Similar Type I error rates occur in the 
UK, Australia, and Belgium.2   
                                                          
1 Under SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988), auditors are required to assess a firm’s going concern ability in the following 12 
months.  If the auditor has ‘substantial doubt’ about the entity’s ability to carry on the business, the auditor must 
generate a GCO in the audit report. 
2 See Carson et al. (2013) for a review of the relevant empirical findings.  Nogler (1995), reports lower survival rates 
(around 30–40%), when using a longer-term perspective and a broader deﬁnition of corporate failure. 
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There are several reasons why there might be over-occurrence of Type I error, particularly in the 
U.S.  First, professional standards maintain that a GCO is not a prediction of business failure on the 
part of the auditor (PCAOB 2015a)—it is a review of a firm’s financial status with regard to prior 
financial years.  Second, auditors face litigation risk if they do not report a GCO and the firm 
subsequently fails (Type II error)—with financial consequences high enough to threaten the viability 
of even the largest audit firm (Defond and Zhang, 2014).  These factors lead auditors to behave in a 
conservative manner and lean towards recording a higher possibility of recording Type I error than is 
justified by fundamentals (Thoman, 1996; Deng et al., 2014).   
The question then is how do we filter out differential audit signals and provide viable information 
to the market on long term viability?  In this paper we use the recorded trading of corporate insiders 
(executives, directors, major shareholders) as predictors of subsequent one-year going concern 
withdrawals (GCOW). 3  We use corporate insiders because they know more about obtuse firm 
operations and financial accounts than any outsider and use that asymmetric knowledge to trade.  For 
example, insiders profitably trade on the accrual/cash ratio (Beneish and Vargus, 2002, Hodgson and 
Van Praag, 2006), sell before a break in positive earning strings (Ke et al., 2003), and trade on the 
R&D intangible (Aboody and Lev, 2000). 
Our paper compliments prior GCO research that reveals an empirical tension around price and 
information impacts.  One strand casts doubt on the information conveyed by GCO announcements 
finding insignificant negative price reactions (Elliot, 1982; Dodd et al. 1984; Ogneva and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Herbohn et al. 2007).  Explanations variously invoke capital market efficiency 
(Herbohn et al. 2007), the concurrent release of other financial information (Elliott 1982; Dodd et al. 
                                                          
3 We use legal corporate insider transactions required to be reported to the SEC within two business days from the 
time of the transaction. 
4 
 
1984; Blay et al. 2016; Myers et al. 2016), or the fact that EDGAR allows investors to immediately 
access all important company information events.   
A competing strand asserts that markets are incompletely informed beforehand, with GCOs 
invoking significant negative abnormal returns at announcement and in subsequent periods (Taffler 
et al., 2004; Kausar et al. 2009; Menon and Williams 2010).  Kausar et al. (2009) and Menon and 
Williams (2010) attribute the lack of US market reaction to missing GCO observations, investor 
inattention, and a market unable to impound the impending (and ex-post) GCO information in a 
timely manner.  Moreover, unexpected GCOs are associated with significantly greater negative stock 
price reactions (Loudder et al., 1992; Fleak and Wilson 1994; Blay and Geiger 2001), whilst the absence 
of an expected GCO is associated with positive return reversals (Jones, 1996). 
Given the tension between mixed results some research focusses on market participants who 
have greater insight.  For example, institutional shareholders short a greater level of stocks before a 
GCO (Kaplan et al., 2014), and start selling stocks six months before GCO release and remain as net 
sellers in the subsequent quarter (Geiger and Kumas, 2016).  In addition, Pheixinho and Taffler (2014) 
document that financial analysts downgrade stock recommendations and reduce coverage of firms 
before they receive a GCO. 
To summarise, prior literature conveys a story of conservative auditors prone to over-use GCOs 
to circumvent legal censor and inattentive investors who do not anticipate or under/overreact to GCO 
announcements.  Hence, these factors induce us to ask if there are possible arbitrage opportunities 
and, if so, who is in an enhanced position to take advantage?  Building on the insights of Kaplan et 
al., (2014) and Geiger and Kumas (2016), we argue that corporate insiders who have intimate first-
hand knowledge of firm operations, are a reliable barometer of the quality of a GCOs.  This prognosis 
is supported by a range of studies that report insiders adjust trading behaviour around major corporate 
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events and earn significant positive cumulative abnormal returns (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; 
Ryan et al., 2016).  Prior research has examined insider trading around GCOs, but the focus has been 
on trading volumes, and trading before a GCO announcement.  For example, Chen et al. (2013) find 
a negative association between the level of insider selling and potential first-time GCOs, citing 
pressure lobbying by firms to modify opinions.  However, Stanley at al. (2009) and Dhaliwal et al. 
(2016) reject the lobbying pressure hypothesis by reporting that insiders execute abnormal sales before 
the announcement of a GCO, and suggest ex-ante information based trading is a better explanation. 
Our paper extends these studies in several ways.  We add abnormal returns as a measure of 
economic impact as well as trading volumes, decompose first time GCOs into continuing GCOs at 
the next annual report (GCOCs) and withdrawn (GCOWs), and extend the analysis to market 
reactions from pre-announcement to post-reaction on publicly available audit reports.  Using a US 
sample of 537 first-time GCO firms over fiscal years 1999 to 2015, we show that the 290 GCOC firms 
continue their downward negative return trend, whilst 247 GCOW firms attain positive returns.  We 
find that net insider purchase activity predicts GCOW’s, front-runs abnormal returns with a strong 
association between documented financial concerns (Menon and Williams, 2010), with corporate 
insiders sharing information within a network consistent with herding (Alldredge and Blank, 2018).  
Finally, the decomposition into GCOC and GCOW firms offers an alternative explanation to prior 
results which report no price reaction after GCO announcements.  Using propensity score matching, 
results are robust to an alternative explanation that insiders, instead of trading on GCO Type I error, 
are trading on improved financial performance.  In addition, after dropping trades which are classified 
as routine following Cohen et al.’s (2012) algorithm, all prior results still hold.  
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We contribute in several respects.  To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide 
evidence that corporate insiders make use of asymmetric knowledge of an auditor’s GCO Type I error, 
to gain abnormal profits by strategically timing their trading.  In doing so, we extend insider 
trading/GCO studies to ex-post trading on public announcements, show how insider trading volume 
converts into abnormal returns, and condition trading and returns on firm risk factors and insider 
hierarchy.  Results inform investors of the economic consequences of Type I audit reporting error, 
and offer an explanation as to why prior studies, that do not separate GCOWs from GCOCs, provide 
conflicting evidence on post GCO abnormal returns.  
The remainder of the paper now proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of related 
literature, section 3 develops hypotheses, and section 4 contains the research models.  Section 5 
describes the data collection process and main results, section 6 reports several additional analysis and 
robustness tests, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Background Review 
2.1 The Going Concern Opinion 
A mandatory requirement in auditing standards is that auditors must assess the going concern ability 
of the firm in each and every audit (PCAOB, 2015b).  AICPA (1988) and the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 require auditors, when reporting a going concern opinion, to include 
an explanatory paragraph about the financial difficulties that gave rise to that uncertainty and any 
viable plans that have the capability of removing the threat to firm continuation.  
Specific guidance on important matters to be considered by auditors in assessing their clients’ 
going concern status is contained in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 2 (AICPA 1974).  In 
SAS No. 34 (AICPA 1981) and later, SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988), auditors are required to evaluate if 
there is substantial doubt regarding clients’ ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable 
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period of time—not to exceed one year beyond the balance sheet date.  In particular, auditors evaluate 
corroborative evidence on identified conditions and events, and assess the probability of the success 
of management in implementing plans to mitigate going concern risks.  If they conclude that 
substantial doubt exists, and the entity has adequately disclosed relevant details in the financial 
statements, auditors modify the audit opinion to include an explanatory paragraph to account for 
substantial doubt.  Hence the issuance of a GCO impacts firm valuation if the market perceives that 
it conveys the auditor’s private assessment of the financial condition of the firm.       
One implied purpose of the assessment of a firm’s going concern ability is to inform outside users 
about concerns of financial stability and consequently risk and valuation.  Given the auditor has inside 
information of client financial performance and access to relevant management plans, this represents 
new information.  Hence, such an ex-post information hypothesis predicts that GCO announcements have 
short term negative connotations for firm value (Mutchler, 1984) and Kausar et al. (2009) document 
a negative 14% market drift in the subsequent year for US firms receiving first time GCOs.  The 
negative drift is variously associated with noisier and/or less persistent earnings (Choi and Jeter, 1992), 
small firms that have relatively low institutional ownership and financial distress (Blay et al., 2016), 
and unexpected GCOs (Loudder et al., 1992; Fleak and Wilson 1994).   
Other research suggests that market reaction is inconsistent in the short term because of investor 
inattention, behavioural dispositions, insufficient skills or acquisition costs (Blankespoor et al., 2017).  
For example, Taffler et al. (2004) [UK study] and Menon and Williams (2010) [US study] show that 
the average return of CGO firms underperforms the average return of size matched non-GCO firms 
only over the long-run.  They argue that incomplete markets are inefficient and are unable to impound 
the information contained a GCO in a timely fashion.  The review article of Ittonen (2012) offers 
explanations based on confounding market signals, rather than inefficient markets.  Classifying GCO 
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reactions by short-window and long-window reactions, Ittonen (2012) posits that conflicting empirical 
results occur because of the confounding release of other value relevant information.  For example 
embedded signals of impending bankruptcy (see also Chen and Church, 1996; Holder-Webb and 
Wilkins, 2000), and Type I error that results in GCOW (see also Fields and Wilkins, 1991; Fargher 
and Wilkins, 1998).  Regardless of interpretation this research suggests an impeded information hypothesis 
whereby information leaks into prices at a constrained pace. 
On the other hand an ex-ante information hypothesis predicts no-reaction when a GCO is released.  
Ex-ante information is effectively inferred from past financial statements (Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et 
al., 1987), and from the fact that an impending GCO is often preceded by important events that are 
disclosed prior to the issuance of the 10-K (Elliott 1982; Dodd et al. 1984).  Additionally, EDGAR 
allows investors to immediately access company filings and Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits the 
selective disclosure of material information to parties outside of the company.  Expectations may also 
be influenced by the actions of better informed institutional traders and financial analysts.  For 
example, institutional shorting and selling stocks up to six months before a GCO announcement 
(Kaplan et al., 2014; Geiger and Kumas, 2016),4 and the actions of financial analysts who issue 
downgrade recommendations and cease coverage for firms before they receive a GCO (Pheixinho 
and Taffler, 2014).  
2.2 Type I Error and Going Concern Withdrawals 
Prior research reports considerable Type I going concern reporting errors occur for firms that do not 
eventually go bankrupt in the long term (eg., Francis and Krishnan 2002; Geiger and Rama 2006; 
Menon and Williams 2010; Myers et al. 2016).  For example, Francis and Krishnan (2002) identify a 
mean 80.38% Type I error (143 bankruptcies for 729 GCO firms) by big six auditors in the US from 
                                                          
4 However, Geiger and Kumas (2016) also find that institutional investors remain as net sellers in the post GCO quarter 
indicating that the market does not fully anticipate or react in a timely manner. 
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1990-1994.  Hopwood et al. (1989) and Raghunandan and Rama (1995) focus on a short term 
approach and report that around 90% of going concern firms do not enter into bankruptcy in the 
following year.  A common explanation for Type I error is litigation risk.  Defond and Zhang (2014) 
assert that litigation damage claims against auditors may be large enough to threaten the viability of 
even the largest audit firm and leads auditors to behave in an excessive risk-averse manner (Thoman, 
1996; Deng et al., 2014).   
The research of Kausar et al. (2009) addresses the possibility of Type I error and reports that 16% 
of 1,293 first-time GCO’s jn US firms receive a subsequent GCOW.  The GCOW has significant 
economic impact with 25% buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the following 12 months, 
reversing the prior 12 month downward drift of 17%.5  Prior studies also find significant price 
reversals on qualified GCO opinions (Dodd et al., 1984; Dopuch et al. 1987; Fields and Wilkins, 1991), 
and Fargher and Wilkins (1998) report a reduction in risk.  Of note is managerial behavioural reactions 
that serve to reverse the financial implications of a GCO.  A GCO provides incentives for 
management to implement policies to improve financial performance and retain managerial reputation.  
Hence, the transition from a GCO to a GCOW contains substantial price related information and 
traders who can perceive this information in a timely manner can expect to extract arbitrage returns. 
3 Hypotheses 
3.1 Ex-Post GCO Disaggregation 
In framing our first hypotheses there are two research issues raised.  The first is whether GCO 
announcements contain price related information.  Do GCOs contain incremental negative 
                                                          
5 Reversal of GCOs have substantial economic impact.  An earlier study by Fields and Wilkins (1991) examined 52 
withdrawn “subject to” opinions5 (STOWs) in the US market from 1978 to 1987 and found announcement day average 
abnormal returns of 2.298% and a further 2.8% return over the next 10 days.   
 
10 
 
information that induces post-announcement price changes?  Alternatively, has the market already 
incorporated ex-ante information into prices with a resultant no-announcement price impact?   
The second is whether GCOs contain significant levels of Type I error which then converts 
into a GCOW reversal in the next annual audit review.  If Type I error is induced by a risk adverse 
approach to audit litigation costs and loss of reputation if the firm subsequently goes bankrupt, then 
if this factor has information content, an erroneous GCO would result in no price impact.  On the 
other hand, if the audit report contained in the GCO contains private information of continued 
economic problems, then abnormal returns will be negative.  Our first hypothesis examines the pooled 
GCO data, followed by an alternative decomposition hypothesis: 
H1A: The pooled announcements of GCO’s contain incremental negative information. 
 
H1B:  GCO announcements that contain Type I error that lead to a GCOW within one year 
will have a significantly lower negative impact on stock prices. 
 
In formulating the above hypotheses we introduce tension in the information flow assumptions.  In 
essence, H1A overtly assumes that GCO announcements contain incremental information and the 
predictions of the ex-ante information hypothesis do not hold.  H1B implicitly assumes that the market 
is aware of the potential error in an auditor’s judgement.  However, we conjecture that all firms contain 
asymmetric information to outside investors and the announcement of a GCO is a noisy market signal.  
Our prediction is that any market price reaction will be slow and will be empirically consistent with an 
impeded information hypothesis. 
3.2 Insider Trading Behaviour and Type I Error 
However, to corporate insiders who have a more intimate knowledge of a firm’s performance, audit 
opinions might contain less noise.  We base the presumption on research that reveals corporate 
insiders are more knowledgeable about obtuse firm operations through financial accounting numbers.  
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For example, Beneish and Vargus (2002) and Hodgson and Praag (2006) show that insiders profitably 
trade on the accrual/cash ratio, insiders sell to anticipate a break in positive earning strings (Ke et al., 
2003), and Aboody and Lev (2000) reveal that R&D contributes to information asymmetry which 
creates profitable trading opportunities for insiders.  To date there are few papers on insider trading 
as a signal of GCO quality.  One by Dhaliwal et al. (2016) reports that insider selling volumes increase 
at least 2 years prior to a GCO, with the accelerated trading undertaken to avoid litigation (Ke et al., 
2003).  In contrast, Chen at al. (2013) introduce the “pressure hypothesis”, that insiders of distressed 
firms will pressure auditors not to issue a GCO during periods they undertake substantial selling.  
Hence, there is a negative association between insider selling and the probability of receiving a GCO. 
Hence, we argue that corporate insider trading may provide an incremental signal that the auditor 
has invoked Type I error which will be quickly reversed. We then have our second hypothesis formed 
as 
H2: After a GCO, firms with a higher net purchase ratio are more likely to receive a GCOW in 
the subsequent audit report.  
 
3.3 Insider Trading Behaviour and Market Reaction 
We note several aspects from the above.  Prior literature reports mixed results pertaining to 
market reaction after a first-time GCO with a theoretical tension around market efficiency.  A number 
of studies (e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Jones, 1996; Carlson et al., 1998; Taffler, 2004; Kausar et al., 
2009; Menon and Williams, 2010) document significant negative market responses over short and long 
windows after GCO disclosure, suggesting that information in a first time GCO is impounded slowly 
by the market.  Others document insignificant reactions to a supposed bad news GCO report with 
most or nearly all of the price impact impounded beforehand (Dodd et al., 1984; Blay and Geiger, 
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2001; Basu, 2004; Herbohn et al., 2007; Myers et al., 2016; Blay et al., 2016).6  Explanations revolve 
around rationally derived preconditioned expectations that are gleaned from research activities and/or 
continuous disclosure regimes that enable prediction of fundamental value (per Ball and Brown, 1968).  
Such results are consistent with a rich continuous information environment—the market has 
anticipated the GCOs with a leading negative reaction impounded up to 12 months in advance.   
The second issue is related to insider trading research and GCOs.  Prior research concentrates 
on trading metrics and is completely focused on the period before the GCO is issued.  We extend this 
research by focussing on the post GCO period and abnormal stock returns.  Specifically, whether the 
insider trading metrics generate abnormal returns and whether the subsequent GCOW is associated 
with differential abnormal returns.  Consequently, one may plausibly argue that an observation of no 
abnormal price reaction after GCOs is caused by insider awareness of auditor Type I error, which 
when pooled with the GCOC firms, reduces their negative impact (Kausar et al., 2009).  This leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
H2: After a GCO and prior to a GCOW announcement, a higher insider net purchase ratio has 
a positive relation with future abnormal returns. 
 
H3:  After a GCO and prior to a GCOC announcement, the insider net purchase ratio has no 
relation with future abnormal returns. 
 
                                                          
6 For example, Dodd et al. (1984) find significant negative price reactions before a first time GCO, but none afterwards.  
Similarly, Herbohn et al. (2007) find negative 32% abnormal returns in the 12 months preceding a GCO and none 
afterwards.  Basu (2004) reports that 95% of price declines occur prior to a GCO announcement. Myers et al. (2016) 
document that GCOs have no significant incremental information value over earnings announcements for a US sample 
(2004 to 2012), using cumulative abnormal returns CAR (0, +2) days, and abnormal trading volume (0, +2) days.  
Blay and Geiger (2001) find insignificant abnormal returns for GCOs for eventually bankrupt firms, which is 
consistent with a higher prior assessed probability of bankruptcy by the market. Finally, Blay et al. (2016) provide 
evidence that the market fully impounds the incremental information of GCOs. 
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4 Data and Research Design 
4.1 Data 
Firms with first-time GCOs over the 1999-2015 period are collected from the Audit Analytics database 
with a requirement that they have a subsequent audit report available.  We then follow the Menon and 
Williams (2010) manual procedure by confirming correctness of first-time GCOs on the SEC Edgar 
website.  The Compustat database is used to obtain matched annual accounting variables.  Finally, 
insider trading data is obtained from the Thomson Reuter database for all insider purchases and sales 
which occurred around the first-time GCO.  Consistent with Frankel and Li (2004) and Brochet (2010) 
we keep only insider open market purchases and sales, drop transactions with codes “A” and “P” and 
delete transactions with trading volume smaller than 100.  All insider trades are then aggregated at the 
firm-quarter level to obtain a net insider purchase ratio (per Ke et al., 2001).  The final sample contains 
first time GCO observations for 37 firms, of which 247 are GCOW firms and 290 are GCO firms 
that survived and received a GCOC in the next audit report.7   
4.2 Net Purchase Ratios 
To conduct the transaction empirical tests, we first define period Q(1) (Q(-1)) as the first three months 
after (before) the announcement of the first-time GCO, and then respectively define periods Q(2) 
(Q(-2)), Q(3) (Q(-3)) and Q(4) (Q(-4)) as the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter after (before) the announcement 
date of the first-time GCO. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2013) use predicted insider trades 
to infer insider trading behaviour. We diverge by measuring insider trading behaviour using actual real 
time insider trades to calculate the net purchase ratio.  
In order to avoid the impact of the seasonal trend found in insider trading (Ferreira and Ravina, 
2010), we proxy insider trading behaviour around the first-time GCO using the change of net purchase 
                                                          
7 The GCOW ratio in this sample is higher than the initial 32% reported by Kauser et al (2009) as we restrict the 
firms to have at least one insider transaction in the four years before the first-time GCO and one year after the GCO. 
If we release the restriction, we obtain a similar GCOW ratio as reported in the Appendix.   
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ratio (∆NPR). Following the literature, net purchase ratio (NPR) is defined as the difference between 
the total volumes of insider purchases and the total volume of sales, scaled by the total insider trading 
volume in the same quarter. We then measure the change of insider net purchase ratio at quarter X in 
year t as the difference of the NPR at quarter X in year t and the average NPR at quarter X in the 
previous four years. 
4.3 Baseline Model 
For testing whether insiders in GCOW firms are net purchasers with higher NPR and ∆NPRs 
than those in CGCO firms, we run multivariate regressions with controls from the insider trading 
literature: natural log of total assets (SIZE) because firm size has a negative correlation with insider 
trading activity (Seyhun, 1986); book to market ratio (BM) and past year annual stock return (RET) to 
control for contrarian trading tendencies (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter, 
2005); a dummy variable for research and development expenses (R&D) as a measure of firm 
opaqueness (Aboody and Lev, 2000); and a loss dummy (LOSS), following Huddart and Ke (2007) 
and Brochet (2010), and the auditing literature:  short – long investment securities (INVEST), 
liabilities/assets (LEV), operating cash flow (OCF), Altman’s probability of bankruptcy (ZSCORE), 
earnings announcement lag (ANNLAG), big 4 auditor (BIG4), indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm has new equity or debt in the last year (NEWFIN), and natural og of firm age (AGE) per Chen 
et al. (2013).  The base regression model is: 
BHAR = α1 + α2∆NPR_Q(-4) + α3∆NPR_Q(-3) + α4∆NPR_Q(-2) + α5∆NPR_Q(-1) 
            + α6∆NPR_Q(1) + α7∆NPR_Q(2) + α8∆NPR_Q(3) + α9∆NPR_Q(4) 
            + α10SIZE + α11BM + α12RET + α13LOSS + α14R&D + α15INVEST 
            + α16LEV + α17OCF + α18ZSCORE + α19ANNLAG + α20BIG4  
            + α21NEWFIN + α22AGE + Industry FE + Year FE + ε                              (1)                                                      
 
where ∆NPR_Q(X) is the (-)Xth quarter’s change of net purchase ratio; Industry FE and Year FE are 
industry and year fixed effects.  If GCOW is good news and insiders trade on the information, we 
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expect the market will response to those companies with a higher ∆NPR after first time GCOs, and 
therefore we expect that the coefficients for α6, α7, α8 and α9 should be significantly positive  
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Market Returns 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the sample split into GCOC and GCOW for the year prior 
to the GCO.  All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the 1st percentile on both tails 
of the distribution.  All firms had poor financial performance over the year prior to their first-time 
GCOs, as reflected in their negative annual returns (RET), net income (LOSS) and operating cash 
flows (OCF).  The two groups have similar firm characteristics in most aspects.  The only significant 
difference is that GCOW firms are significantly larger than GCOC firms (4.579 vs 3.997), have a lower 
negative OCF (-0.303 vs -0.411), a greater level of FIN_ISS (0.50 vs 0.387), and a slightly higher 
reporting lag for financial reports.  The other firm characteristics are not significantly different.  In 
short, there are no strong financial and operating indicators that would alert outside investors or 
analysts to anticipate which firm will receive a GCOC or GCOW in the subsequent year.    
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We now turn to market returns to trace impact after the GCO announcement.  Figure 1 plots 
the market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal pooled returns and when decomposed into GCOW and 
GCOC returns.  Two aspects are notable.  Returns for the pooled GCO announcements are 
consistently negative for most of the post announcement year but after the subsequent one year lagged 
audit report they become insignificant.  The statistical significance of this one year inter-temporal price 
evolution can be observed in table 2 where returns are significantly negative until they turn 
insignificant at trading day 240.  In this sense, we could argue that a GCO contains incremental 
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negative information for the market, but only in the short term with price mean reversion over the 
longer term. 
However when we decompose into GCOW and GCOC at the subsequent one year audit re-
evaluation we observe very difference price evolutions between the two sub-samples.  After GCO 
announcement, there are slightly negative returns for GCOWs for the next 30 days, followed by a 
slow positive increase, and then a positive acceleration from 180 trading days out.  For GCOC firms 
there is a continuing negative return decline.  The differential price impact is statistically confirmed by 
t-tests in table 2 panel A.  Table 2 panel B reports regression results which control for firm and market 
specific factors.  GCOW has a significantly higher positive post GCO announcement return compared 
to firms who subsequently receive a GCOC.  Of note, however, is that these returns do not 
significantly deviate before 30 days after the GCO and prior studies who analysed short term market 
reaction (implicitly assuming market efficiency), in the main do not report longer term adjustments.  
Further, none of the control variables were consistently significant with the exception of LEV in the 
short term.   
Three interpretations arise.  First, an observation that GCO opinions have no long run price 
impact is dominated by pooled data that includes auditors’ Type I error.  Second, confirmatory 
announcements by external auditors have substantial negative market impact for GCOC firms but not 
for GCOW firms.  Third, there are few clues available to outside investors that would immediately 
alert them to auditor Type I error.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 & TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The question then is why the returns deviate, and what factors contribute to the price 
deviations?  To explore possible answers, we extend the analyses to the trading behaviour of corporate 
insiders and the subsequent returns from their trading. 
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5.2 Insider Trading Behaviour after GCO announcement 
Following Chen et al. (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2016) we analyse pre and post insider trading volumes 
but additional add the association with returns.  Table 3 presents regression results from an analysis 
of the association between the quarterly lagged and leading ∆NPR around the first-time GCO, and 
subsequent abnormal returns.  If corporate insider trading is informative we expect a positive 
association with abnormal returns.  Panel A shows that increased insider purchases in the quarter 
immediately following the GCO (∆NPR_Q1) results in significant long term returns.  This is also the 
case for ∆NPR_Q3 during the period of accelerated price increases for GCOW firms.  Hence, insider 
purchases provide both a predictive and a confirmatory signal of a subsequent GCOW.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 & TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The comparable timing of corporate insider transactions for GCOC firms is reported in panel B.  
There is no consistent and significant relationship between insider trading volumes and abnormal 
returns.  Univariate results confirm the net purchase ratios are higher for GCOW firms in all quarters 
following the GCO announcement.  In particular, the deviation from GCOC firms is the highest 
directly after the GCO announcement indicating greater confidence in GCOW future performance.   
In Table 4 we report insider trading as a factor related to the cited reason.  We use FIN_ISS, 
problems with raising finance, as a cited variable that has been previously diagnosed as an indicator of 
an extreme reason for declaring a GCO.  Our counter logic is that if firms are conservatively labelled 
as a GCO then this factor would not be as problematic for the firm.  Given outside investors view 
this as a negative and noisy signal the probability is that the market will over-react and create possible 
arbitrage opportunities for insiders.  Our prediction is that purchase trading volume will increase in 
the time period directly after the release of the cited factor, but only for GCOC firms.  Consistent 
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with predictions, panel A confirms a significant positive relationship for GCOW firms and no 
significant increase in purchase activity for GCOC firms in panel B. 
 
 
5.3 Insider Trading Behaviour and Market Reaction  
Following Chen et al. (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2016), we analyse pre and post insider ΔNPR but 
additionally add the association with returns. Table 4 displays regression results from an analysis of 
the association between the quarterly lagged and leading ΔNPR around the first time GCO, and 
subsequent abnormal returns. If corporate insider trading is informative we expect a positive 
association with abnormal returns. Panel A shows that increased insider purchases in the quarter 
immediately following the GCO (ΔNPR_Q1) results in significant long term returns. This is also the 
case for ΔNPR _Q3 during the period of accelerated price increases for GCOW firms. Hence, insider 
purchases provide both a predictive and a confirmatory signal of a subsequent GCOW. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The comparable timing of corporate insider transactions for GCOC firms is reported in panel B. 
There is no consistent and significant relationship between insider trading volumes and abnormal 
returns. Univariate results confirm the net purchase ratios are higher for GCOW firms in all quarters 
following the GCO announcement. In particular, the deviation from GCOC firms is the highest 
directly after the GCO announcement indicating greater confidence in GCOW future performance. 
6 Robust Test and Additional Analysis 
6.1 Propensity Score Matching 
Instead of having Type I error and a subsequent GCOW stimulating insiders to extract information 
rents, an alternative explanation for the results is that GCOW firms in the sample have distinguishing 
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features driving trading behaviours.  For instance, GCOW firms may have a reduced leverage ratio, a 
new issuance of debt or equity contract, or a better return on equity which is recognized by insiders 
as good news.  Therefore, insiders may be trading on improved financial or accounting indices, instead 
of trading on GCOW information.   
To test for robustness, propensity score matching is used to match firms in the sample that 
receive a GCOW to firms that do not receive a GCOW based on proxies for the level of insider 
trading intensity.  Following the method of Zmijewski (1984) and DeFond et al., (2002), the probability 
of receiving a GCO opinion is reported in Table 5.  Panel B of Table 5 shows that all variables are not 
statistically different between GCOW and CGCO firms after propensity score matching, indicating 
that the matching process is effective and there is no bias. Results regarding market reaction and 
insider trading behaviour in Panel C is qualitatively the same as the results found before. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
6.2 Routine Trades 
Acknowledging the fact that not all insider trading is motivated by a desire to exploit information 
asymmetries, Cohen et al. (2012) suggest that some transactions by insiders are routine, driven by 
liquidity or portfolio rebalancing reasons.  Thus, the results may be explained by the fact that insiders 
in GCOW firms are net purchasers for portfolio rebalancing.  We follow the algorithm suggested by 
Cohen et al. (2012) and remove potential routine transactions.  In the untablet results, we consistently 
find insiders buy more often in quarter 1 after FGCO.  
6.3 Insider Trading Behaviour and Cited Reason 
If there is a determination of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going 
concern, then the auditor must identify the pertinent conditions giving rise to that assessment 
(PCAOB 2015a). Menon and Williams (2010) classify GCOs that are having trouble obtaining 
financing as a severe reason for a GCO, and report greater relative negative stock price reaction. More 
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recently, Chen et al. (2015) document that firms who have multiple problems (e.g., financing 
difficulties, operating difficulties, and others) subsequently leads to tighter loan contract conditions 
(e.g., interest rate, maturity, number and type of loan covenants) and higher financial stress. Their 
results highlight the informative value contained in different GCO reasons and provide empirical 
evidence on the price impact beyond a simple binary decision to modify their report. 
 On the other hand if a subsequent GCOW firm is mooted as having financial difficulties, but 
is in a stronger position to gain external finance than perceived by the market, then the market may 
well price-overreact. Insiders then increase their trading to take advantage of mispricing as contrarian 
traders (Lakonshok and Lee, 2001). In short, insiders have greater awareness of the severity of the 
first-time GCO, they are more likely to be relative higher net buyers of GCOW firms with audit cited 
financing problems. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 In Table 6 we report insider trading as a factor related to the cited reason. We use FIN_ISS, 
problems with raising finance, as a cited variable that has been previously diagnosed as an indicator of 
an extreme reason for declaring a GCO. Our counter logic is that if firms are conservatively labelled 
as a GCO then this factor would not be as problematic for the firm. Given outside investors view this 
as a negative and noisy signal the probability is that the market will over-react and create possible 
arbitrage opportunities for insiders.  Our prediction is that purchase trading volume will increase in 
the time period directly after the release of the cited factor, but only for GCOC firms. Consistent with 
predictions, panel A confirms a significant positive relationship for GCOW firms and no significant 
increase in purchase activity for GCOC firms in panel B. 
6.4 Information Sharing 
Seyhun (1986) suggests an “information hierarchy” hypothesis based on the conjecture that an 
insider’s position in the firm affects their access to information. Prices are most responsive to the 
21 
 
trades of CEOs, CFOs, COOs and less responsive to non-executive directors. Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) provide an updated study on information hierarchy and show that directors and officers 
(defined as managers) have significantly higher trading profits and Ravina and Sapenzia (2010) report 
that executive directors derive more trading profits than independent directors. However, Alldredge 
and Blank (2016) note that insiders tend to trade together in “cascades” that replicate senior executives 
and report that only those insiders who trade together with top managers earn significantly higher 
abnormal returns. 
 We follow prior literature and decompose corporate insiders into three groups according to 
their proported information hierarchy as defined in the Thomson Reuter database. The first group is 
top managers (CEOs, CFOs, COOs, presidents, general counsels and chairs of board). The second 
tier consists of non-executive and independent directors mainly responsible for no strategic and board 
monitoring activities. The third tier consists of corporate officers and administrators.   
 As discussed, the issuance of an audit report needs communication between auditors and 
managers so that the first few insiders knowing the result of the audit report should be the top 
managers. Meanwhile, although other directors and officers have limited access to the audit report, 
they have incentives to extract relevant information.  That is because good and bad audit reports have 
a direct economic impact on firm personnel and stock performance—the incentives to extract private 
information become stronger as the prospect of personal wealth and job security decline. Hence, 
consistent with the research of Alldredge and Blank (2016) and Han and Yang (2013), we expect a 
greater degree of herding and network information sharing in firms under audit stress. 
 Table 7 reports insider size adjusted BHARs after first time GCO announcements.  Panel A 
reports results from insider purchases with column one representing the accumulated time period.  
Column two shows that, in aggregate, insider purchases for eventual GCOW firms is profitable rising 
to a 24.5% return over 180 days.  Columns 3 to 5 provide a comparison between corporate insider 
22 
 
hierarchy grouped as top managers (executives), other directors and officers.  In a dictator type 
corporate governance  it  would  be  expected  that  senior  managers  would  dominate  access  to  
private information and profitability extraction. This is not the case here were all corporate insiders 
derive similar returns consistent with the equally informed findings of Ravina and Sapienza (2009) and 
networking and information sharing of Alldredge and Blank (2016).  For example after 60 days top 
managers (14.8%), directors (14.9%) and officers (13.4%).  For insider selling on GCOWs, returns are 
lower and negative (loss avoidance) but concentrated in directors who mainly constitute independent 
outside directors. There are two explanations. The selling of top managers (managers) contains 
significant amounts of liquidity and diversification trades (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) and/or are 
sensitive to possible litigation from selling on private information. In terms of arbitrage, replication of 
all insider trades in post GCO for GCOW firms, provides a 25.6% return over 60 days. 
 For GCOC firms insider buying and selling provides significantly lower returns with an 
purchases returning a 60 day negative profit of -3.9% and sales a loss avoidance of 4.7%, an overall 
arbitrage return of 0.8%. Hence, we interpret that insider trading in GCOW firms contains a higher 
level of private information. As a final arbitrage, if we replicate all insider trades the 60 day return is 
26.6%. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In Table 8, we also reports whether insiders in different levels will trade together or follow 
insiders in the upper level when facing FGCO. The logit regressions show that insiders will only follow 
other insiders from the same level. For instance, directors will only trade after other directors traded.  
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether corporate insiders are aware of extreme Type I audit error in the 
form of a subsequent going concern opinion withdrawal (GCOW).  We report that a significant 
proportion of first time going concern audit opinions (GCOs) that survive the first year are reversed 
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by a GCOW at the following audit report year.  Separately analysing subgroups of GCOC and GCOW 
firms yields results with significant negative returns after GCO announcement for firms that 
subsequently receive a continuing going concern opinion (GCOC) and positive returns for GCOWs.   
We conjecture and affirm that the anticipatory trading of corporate insiders, with asymmetric private 
information, drives the positive GCOW returns.  Further, insider purchases in GCOW firms is 
associated with financial problems documented by auditors and positively associated with herding by 
all insiders.  In particular, replicating all the transactions of corporate insiders in GCOW (all) firms 
and setting arbitrage hedge portfolios return an average abnormal returns of 25.6% (26.4%) over 60 
days.  For less senior executives the same hedge returns an average abnormal returns of 16.25%. Whilst 
not all insiders are knowledgeable, the hedge returns for blockholders is only 2.62%. 
Our results inform investors of the economic consequences of Type I audit report error and offer an 
explanation as to why prior studies, that do not separate GCOWs from GCOCs, provide conflicting 
post GCO abnormal returns. 
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Figure 1: Market Price Reaction around First-Time GCOs 
This figure displays market reactions afer first-time GCOs for going concern opinion withdrawal (GCOW) and going 
concern opinion conctinuing (GCOC) firms, respectively. Market reactions are measured as the size adjusted abnormal 
returns (BHAR) per Ravina and Saphenza (2010). 
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Figure 2: Average Change in Net Insider Purchase Ratios around the 10-K Filing Date 
This figure compares insider trading behaviour in CGOW and GCOC firms during the 4 quarters prior and post to 
the announcement of the first-time GCO. Insider trading behaviour is proxied by the change in net purchase ratio 
(∆NPR). NPR is the buy and sell share inbalance measured as the total number of shares bought minus the total 
number of shares sold deflated by the total number of shares traded in the firm during the quarter.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports firm performance of the sample at the fiscal year when receiving the first-time GCO for the period 
from 1999-2015. SIZE is the natural log value of total assets; BM is book to market ratio; RET is annual stock return; 
LOSS is an indicate variable equal to 1 if the net income is negative, otherwise 0; R&D is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the R&D expenditure is greater than 0, otherwise 0; INVEST is long and short-term investments scaled by 
total assets; LEV is total liabilities to total assets ratio; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; ZSCORE is 
a measure of probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1994) model; ANNLAG is the natural log value of the 
difference between earnings announcement date and the corresponding fiscal year end date; BIG4 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is the big 4, otherwise 0; NEWFIN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has a new issuance of debt or equity during the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise. AGE is the natural logarithm of 
the number of years the firm recorded in the Compustat database plus 1. TOT_ISS is the total number of cited issues 
for a going concern opinion. FIN_ISS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit going concern opinion cites at 
least one financing issue, 0 otherwise. SEV_ISS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit going concern opinion 
cites poor financial performance, operating and financing issues at the same time, 0 otherwise. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GCOW Firms [N = 247] GCOC Firms [N = 290] Diff. 
(t-test)  Mean Median Std. Dev. p25 p75 Mean Median Std. Dev. p25 p75 
SIZE 4.579 4.185 1.954 3.081 5.908 3.997 3.619 1.759 2.721 4.828 0.582*** 
BM 0.821 0.608 2.453 0.070 1.370 0.899 0.462 1.948 0.157 1.261 -0.078 
RET -0.281 -0.517 0.836 -0.767 -0.082 -0.192 -0.500 1.082 -0.755 -0.127 -0.089 
LOSS 0.927 1 0.260 1 1 0.950 1 0.218 1 1 -0.023 
R&D 0.517 1 0.501 0 1 0.598 1 0.491 0 1 -0.081 
INVEST 0.212 0.092 0.264 0.026 0.303 0.242 0.110 0.280 0.037 0.387 -0.030 
LEV 0.718 0.657 0.475 0.417 0.912 0.658 0.617 0.428 0.371 0.848 0.060 
OCF -0.303 -0.043 0.574 -0.491 0.036 -0.411 -0.189 0.617 -0.650 -0.002 0.108** 
ZSCORE 2.683 1.320 4.848 -0.353 4.405 2.636 1.265 4.747 -0.102 4.075 0.047 
ANNLAG 4.312 4.369 0.435 4.094 4.522 4.348 4.477 0.376 4.190 4.533 -0.036 
BIG4 0.621 1 0.486 0 1 0.631 1 0.483 0 1 -0.010 
NEWFIN 0.648 1 0.479 0 1 0.718 1 0.451 0 1 -0.070* 
AGE 2.141 2.197 0.54 1.792 2.565 2.144 2.197 0.533 1.792 2.485 -0.003 
TOT_ISS 2.476 2 1.220 2 3 2.452 2 1.131 2 3 0.024 
FIN_ISS 0.500 0.500 0.501 0 1 0.387 0 0.488 0 1 0.113*** 
SEV_ISS 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0 0.059 0 0 -0.003 
Panel B: Sample Firms Distribution by Industry and Year 
Industry # of Firms Year # of Firms 
Consumer, Retail and Services 60 1999 37 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 140 2000 74 
Manufacturing 53 2001 69 
Energy 22 2002 59 
Chemicals and Allied Products 12 2003 22 
Business Equipment 101 2004 21 
Utilities, Telephone and Television Transmission 20 2005 27 
Finance 54 2006 23 
Other (Mines, Construction, Transport, Hotels, Entertainment) 75 2007 22 
  2008 48 
  2009 33 
  2010 13 
Total Firms 537 2011 10   2012 22   2013 14   2014 10   2015 33 
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 Table 2: Market Reaction for GCOW and GCOC Firms 
This table reports average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for going concern opinion withdrawal (GCOW) 
and going concern opinion conctinuing (GCOC) firms, respectively. The market reaction is measured as the size 
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), starting from the date when the firm received the first-time GCO. 
Panel A is an event study that exams market reaction after first time GCOs. Panel B reports results based on regression 
analysis. Type I Error is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received a GCOW after the first-time GCO, otherwise 
0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Average Market Reaction after First Time GCOs 
 Pool GCOW GCOC Diff. (t-test) 
BHAR[0,5] -0.034*** -0.024*** -0.042*** 0.018 
BHAR[0,10] -0.033*** -0.019* -0.044*** 0.025* 
BHAR[0,30] -0.031** 0.025 -0.079*** 0.104*** 
BHAR[0,60] -0.038** 0.066** -0.127*** 0.193*** 
BHAR[0,90] -0.076*** 0.067** -0.198*** 0.265*** 
BHAR[0,120] -0.086*** 0.084** -0.230*** 0.314*** 
BHAR[0,180] -0.145*** 0.099* -0.354*** 0.453*** 
BHAR[0,240] -0.060 0.287*** -0.356*** 0.643*** 
BHAR[0,255] -0.071 0.298*** -0.384*** 0.682*** 
BHAR[0,300] -0.102** 0.260*** -0.411*** 0.671*** 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of Market Reaction (Market Adjusted BHAR) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Short-Term Long-Term 
 BHAR5 BHAR60 BHAR120 BHAR180 BHAR240 BHAR300 
Type I Error 0.020 
(1.64) 
0.092*** 
(3.72) 
0.182*** 
(5.16) 
0.425*** 
(7.18) 
0.617*** 
(5.92) 
0.640*** 
(6.69) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 537 537 537 537 537 537 
R2 0.071 0.107 0.146 0.228 0.201 0.238 
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Table 3 Insider Trading Behaviour and Likelihood of Type I Error 
This table reports the logit regression results for the relationship between insider net purchase ratio and the likelihood 
of receiving GCOW in the subsequent period after FGCO. ∆NPV_Q(X) is the change of insider net purchase ratio 
(NPR) at the Xth quarter after FGCO, measured as the difference of NPR at the Xth during the year after (before if 
X is negative) receiving FGCO and the average NPR at Xth quarter in the previous four years. NPR is defined as the 
difference between the total volumes of insider purchases and the total volume of sales, scaled by the total insider 
trading volume in the same quarter. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Logit(Type I Error=1) Logit(Type I Error=1) Logit(Type I Error=1) 
∆NPV_Q(-4) 0.393** 
(2.23) 
 0.102 
(1.11) 
    
∆NPV_Q(-3) -0.306 
(-1.61) 
 -0.347 
(-1.57) 
    
∆NPV_Q(-2) 0.054 
(0.30) 
 -0.012 
(-0.06) 
    
∆NPV_Q(-1) -0.157 
(-0.75) 
 -0.292 
(-1.35) 
    
∆NPV_Q1  0.515*** 
(2.72) 
0.546*** 
(2.82) 
    
∆NPV_Q2  0.028 
(0.14) 
0.070 
(0.34) 
    
∆NPV_Q3  -0.038 
(-0.20) 
-0.046 
(-0.23) 
    
∆NPV_Q4  0.339 
(1.38) 
0.417 
(1.63) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 537 537 537 
R2 0.130 0.134 0.147 
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Table 4: Market Reaction for GCOW and GCOC Firms Conditioned by Insider Trading 
This table reports market reaction conditioned on  insider trading intensity. Panel A and Panel B are for GCOW and 
GCOC Firms, respectively. The market reaction is proxied by size adusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), 
starting from the date when the firm received the FGCO. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is the difference between the 
total volumes of insider purchases and the total volume of sales, scaled by the total insider trading volume in the same 
quarter. ∆NPV_Q(X) is the difference of NPR at the Xth in the year after (before if X is negative) receiving FGCO 
and the average NPR at Xth quarter in the previous four years.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: GCOW Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Short-Term Long-Term 
 BHAR5 BHAR60 BHAR120 BHAR180 BHAR240 BHAR300 
∆NPR_Q(-4) -0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.018 
(0.38) 
0.054 
(0.93) 
0.039 
(0.47) 
0.039 
(0.26) 
0.122 
(0.87) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-3) 0.005 
(0.31) 
-0.082 
(-1.50) 
-0.061 
(-0.78) 
-0.027 
(-0.24) 
0.086 
(0.35) 
-0.080 
(-0.44) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-2) 0.026 
(1.41) 
-0.005 
(-0.10) 
0.024 
(0.36) 
0.044 
(0.46) 
-0.028 
(-0.14) 
0.052 
(0.35) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-1) -0.022 
(-1.02) 
0.069 
(1.05) 
0.104 
(1.36) 
0.074 
(0.68) 
0.151 
(0.76) 
0.090 
(0.54) 
       
∆NPR_Q1 0.017 
(1.00) 
0.127** 
(2.40) 
0.168** 
(2.46) 
0.218** 
(2.37) 
0.314* 
(1.91) 
0.291* 
(1.80) 
       
∆NPR_Q2 0.011 
(0.61) 
-0.009 
(-0.18) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.099 
(0.98) 
0.256 
(1.55) 
0.212 
(1.40) 
       
∆NPR_Q3 0.011 
(0.68) 
0.068 
(1.30) 
0.114 
(1.41) 
0.200* 
(1.96) 
0.441** 
(2.36) 
0.383** 
(2.21) 
       
∆NPR_Q4 -0.028 
(-1.47) 
-0.031 
(-0.52) 
-0.071 
(-0.97) 
-0.121 
(-1.14) 
-0.276 
(-1.51) 
-0.166 
(-1.01) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 247 247 247 247 247 247 
R2 0.155 0.245 0.238 0.288 0.277 0.295 
Panel B: GCOC Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Short-Term Long-Term 
 BHAR5 BHAR60 BHAR120 BHAR180 BHAR240 BHAR300 
∆NPR_Q(-4) -0.002 
(-0.10) 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
-0.023 
(-0.51) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
0.021 
(0.34) 
-0.012 
(-0.17) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-3) -0.023 
(-1.44) 
-0.046 
(-1.16) 
-0.041 
(-0.86) 
-0.023 
(-0.37) 
-0.053 
(-0.75) 
-0.083 
(-1.05) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-2) -0.020 
(-1.14) 
0.010 
(0.27) 
-0.015 
(-0.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
0.018 
(0.28) 
-0.008 
(-0.10) 
       
∆NPR_Q(-1) -0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.016 
(0.31) 
0.019 
(0.38) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
0.014 
(0.16) 
0.028 
(0.31) 
       
∆NPR_Q1 0.045*** 
(2.63) 
0.063 
(1.40) 
0.048 
(0.90) 
0.047 
(0.84) 
-0.021 
(-0.26) 
-0.040 
(-0.46) 
       
∆NPR_Q2 0.007 
(0.38) 
0.022 
(0.55) 
0.006 
(0.13) 
-0.042 
(-0.76) 
-0.041 
(-0.40) 
-0.089 
(-0.93) 
       
∆NPR_Q3 0.015 
(0.74) 
-0.081* 
(-1.71) 
-0.045 
(-0.90) 
0.051 
(0.72) 
0.047 
(0.48) 
0.132 
(1.25) 
       
∆NPR_Q4 0.012 
(0.51) 
-0.071 
(-1.26) 
-0.133** 
(-1.98) 
-0.134* 
(-1.70) 
-0.167 
(-1.64) 
-0.178 
(-1.40) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 290 290 290 290 290 290 
R2 0.160 0.132 0.167 0.162 0.179 0.182 
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Table 5 Robust Tests: Propensity Score Matched Sample 
Panels A presents PSM results from the first stage estimate of the probability of receiving a GCOW in the subsequent 
year after a first time GCO. SIZE is the natural log value of total assets; BM is the book to market ratio; RET is annual 
stock return; LOSS, R&D, BIG4, NEWFIN are indicator variables equal to 1 if net income is negative, if R&D 
expenditure is greater than 0; if the firm’s auditor is a big 4; if the firm has a new issuance of debt or equity during the 
current fiscal year; otherwise zero. INVEST is total investments scaled by total assets; LEV is total liabilities/total 
assets; CHG_LEV is the change of LEV. OCF is operating cash flow/total assets; ZSCORE is the probability of 
bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1994); ANNLAG is the natural log of the difference between earnings 
announcement and the corresponding fiscal year end date; AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age, plus 1. There are 
204 GCOW firms and 261 control GCOC firms. Panel B reports statistical differences between treated (GCOW) and 
control (GCOC) firms, and Panel C shows univariate test results for insider trading behaviour across 8 quarters around 
FGCO. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is the difference between the total volumes of insider purchases and sales, scaled 
by total insider trading volume in the same quarter. ∆NPV_Q(X) is the difference of NPR at the Xth in the year after 
(before if X is negative) receiving FGCO and the average NPR at Xth quarter in the previous four years. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Probability of (GCOW = 1)   
Dep. Var. = GCOW Coeff. p-val. 
SIZE 0.143 0.007*** 
BM 0.006 0.916 
RET -0.045 0.623 
LOSS -0.032 0.902 
R&D -0.112 0.421 
INVEST 0.177 0.556 
LEV 0.372 0.230 
CHG_LEV 0.028 0.786 
OCF -0.031 0.891 
ZSCORE -0.010 0.818 
ANNLAG -0.214 0.185 
BIG4 -0.184 0.173 
NEWFIN -0.290 0.026*** 
AGE -0.059 0.615 
Year FE  Yes 
Industry FE  Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.039 
N  485 
χ2  25.81 
Panel B: Covariate Balance: Propensity Score Matched Sample  
 Treated 
(GCOW = 1) 
Control 
(GCOW = 0) Difference t-statistics 
SIZE 4.125 4.128 -0.003 -0.020 
BM 0.825 0.807 0.018 0.140 
RET -0.318 -0.308 -0.010 -0.160 
LOSS 0.931 0.937 -0.006 -0.240 
R&D 0.598 0.606 -0.008 -0.160 
INVEST 0.227 0.223 0.004 0.180 
LEV 0.646 0.643 0.003 0.100 
CHG_LEV 0.472 0.470 0.002 0.020 
OCF -0.344 -0.344 0.000 0.020 
ZSCORE 2.073 2.062 0.011 0.030 
ANNLAG 4.349 4.334 0.015 0.380 
BIG4 0.657 0.654 0.003 0.060 
NEWFIN 0.672 0.674 -0.002 -0.050 
AGE 2.129 2.139 -0.010 -0.200 
Panel C Insider Trading Behaviour: Propensity Score Matched Sample  
 Treated 
(GCOW = 1) 
Control 
(GCOW = 0) Difference t-statistics 
Market Reaction     
BHAR[0,5] -0.019 -0.026 0.007 0.57 
BHAR[0,60] 0.091 -0.070 0.161 3.86*** 
BHAR[0,120] 0.187 -0.128 0.316 4.90*** 
BHAR[0,180] 0.261 -0.202 0.463 5.95*** 
BHAR[0,240] 0.435 -0.220 0.655 6.06*** 
BHAR[0,300] 0.419 -0.285 0.704 6.83*** 
     
Insider Trading     
∆NPV_Q(-4) 0.162 0.065 0.097 1.670 
∆NPV_Q(-3) 0.058 0.106 -0.048 -0.800 
∆NPV_Q(-2) 0.069 0.033 0.036 0.630 
∆NPV_Q(-1) -0.016 0.014 -0.029 -0.620 
∆NPV_Q1 0.141 0.009 0.132 2.460*** 
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∆NPV_Q2 0.043 0.002 0.041 0.780 
∆NPV_Q3 -0.023 -0.041 0.019 0.330 
∆NPV_Q4 0.012 -0.040 0.052 1.110 
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Table 6: Insider Reaction for GCOW and GCOC Firms Conditioned on Cited Reasons 
This table reports insider reaction conditioned on cited reasons in audit reports. Panel A and Panel B are for GCOW 
and GCOC Firms, respectively. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is the difference between the total volumes of insider 
purchases and the total volume of sales, scaled by the total insider trading volume in the same quarter. ∆NPV_Q(X) 
is the difference of NPR at the Xth in the year after (before if X is negative) receiving FGCO and the average NPR 
at Xth quarter in the previous four years. FIN_ISS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit report cites any 
financing issues, 0 otherwise. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: GCOW Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Before First-Time GCO After First-Time GCO 
 ∆NPR_Q(-
4) 
∆NPR_Q(-
3) 
∆NPR_Q(-
2) 
∆NPR_Q(-
1) 
∆NPR_Q(1) ∆NPR_Q(2) ∆NPR_Q(3) ∆NPR_Q(4) 
FIN_ISS -0.024 
(-0.21) 
-0.069 
(-1.47) 
0.029 
(0.62) 
0.018 
(0.32) 
0.117** 
(2.12) 
0.134** 
(2.08) 
0.179** 
(2.01) 
0.081 
(0.98) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
R2 0.151 0.263 0.231 0.259 0.169 0.223 0.243 0.175 
Panel B: GCOC Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Before First-Time GCO After First-Time GCO 
 ∆NPR_Q(-
4) 
∆NPR_Q(-
3) 
∆NPR_Q(-
2) 
∆NPR_Q(-
1) 
∆NPR_Q(1) ∆NPR_Q(2) ∆NPR_Q(3) ∆NPR_Q(4) 
FIN_ISS 0.015 
(0.12) 
-0.075 
(-0.56) 
0.083 
(0.83) 
0.024 
(0.22) 
-0.038 
(-0.63) 
-0.076 
(-0.97) 
0.026 
(0.16) 
0.104 
(1.20) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
R2 0.145 0.261 0.242 0.272 0.161 0.223 0.238 0.167 
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Table 7 Insider Trading Profits by Information Hierarchy 
This table reports event study results on insider trading profits. Panel A and Panel B report insider purchase and sale 
profits, respectively. Insiders are classified as top executive (CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, CTO, general counsel, general 
manager or partner, managing director or partner, president and executive or senior vice president), Director (all other 
directors not in the top executive group) and Officer (all other officers not in the top executive and director groups). 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Insider Purchases 
  GCOW GCOC  
All 
[N = 1,442] 
Top Managers 
[N = 670] 
Directors 
[N = 687] 
Officers 
[N= 85] 
All 
[N = 1,274] 
Top Managers 
[N = 552] 
Directors 
[N = 658] 
Officers 
[N= 64] 
BHAR[0,5] 0.049** 0.034* 0.063* 0.029 0.021** 0.015 0.030 -0.004 
BHAR[0.60] 0.149** 0.148** 0.149*** 0.134** -0.039** -0.056* -0.019 -0.088** 
BHAR[0,120] 0.201*** 0.174*** 0.228*** 0.206** -0.139*** -0.135*** -0.153*** -0.105** 
BHAR[0,180] 0.245*** 0.208*** 0.269*** 0.253** -0.158*** -0.141*** -0.189*** -0.172** 
Panel B: Insider Sales 
  GCOW GCOC  
All 
[N = 1,212] 
Top Managers 
[N = 390] 
Directors 
[N = 641] 
Officers 
[N= 181] 
All 
[N = 1065 
Top Managers 
[N = 492] 
Directors 
[N = 429] 
Officers 
[N= 144] 
BHAR[0,5] -0.017* -0.002 -0.030* -0.005 -0.024* -0.014 -0.039* -0.012* 
BHAR[0.60] -0.107** -0.054* -0.164*** -0.005 -0.047* -0.111** 0.061 -0.145** 
BHAR[0,120] -0.138*** -0.031 -0.234*** -0.007 -0.272*** -0.297*** -0.205*** -0.357*** 
BHAR[0,180] -0.176*** -0.072* -0.299*** 0.062* -0.405*** -0.437*** -0.350*** -0.370*** 
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Table 8: Insider Herding 
This table contains logit regressions predicting insider trading as a function of other insider trading at the firm. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for an insider trade on day t by insider role. Insiders are classified as top managers 
(Top_man), managers (Man), Directors and Officers. Size is the log of total assets. BM is the book-to-market ratio. 
LEV is total liabilities to total assets ratio; LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the net income is negative, 
otherwise 0; RET is annual stock return; R&D is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the R&D expenditure is greater 
than 0, otherwise 0. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust 
and clustered at firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Insider Purchase 
 GCOW GCOC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Top_Mant Directort Officert Top_Mant Directort Officert 
Top_Mant-2,t 2.217*** 
(7.26) 
-2.138*** 
(-7.53) 
-0.596 
(-1.36) 
1.449*** 
(4.72) 
-1.312*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.399 
(-0.95) 
       
Directort-2,t -2.131*** 
(-5.57) 
2.818*** 
(7.86) 
-0.729** 
(-2.37) 
-1.686*** 
(-7.02) 
1.976*** 
(7.47) 
-1.189*** 
(-3.31) 
       
Officert-2,t -1.341** 
(-1.99) 
-0.532 
(-1.31) 
3.636*** 
(6.58) 
-0.131 
(-0.34) 
-0.700* 
(-1.90) 
1.807*** 
(5.54) 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8339 8339 8339 9892 9892 9892 
adj. R2 0.232 0.189 0.471 0.209 0.165 0.367 
Panel B: Insider Sale 
 GCOW GCOC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Top_Mant Directort Officert Top_Mant Directort Officert 
Top_Mant-2,t 2.719*** 
(5.24) 
-2.785*** 
(-3.63) 
-1.852*** 
(-3.28) 
0.976* 
(1.73) 
-1.010 
(-1.61) 
-0.157 
(-0.28) 
       
Directort-2,t -3.040** 
(-2.40) 
4.370*** 
(2.61) 
-2.193*** 
(-5.52) 
-3.235*** 
(-5.40) 
3.394*** 
(5.81) 
-1.173** 
(-2.44) 
       
Officert-2,t -2.363*** 
(-3.50) 
-2.696*** 
(-3.30) 
3.162*** 
(4.78) 
-0.365 
(-0.39) 
-0.770 
(-1.27) 
0.414 
(0.44) 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10132 10132 10132 10132 10132 10132 
adj. R2 0.1!2 0.123 0.253 0.102 0.105 0.140 
41 
 
Table 9: Likelihood of Changing Auditor after FGCO Conditioning on Insider Trading 
This table reports the logit regression results for the likelihood of changing the auditor after receiving FGCO. Net 
purchase ratio (NPR) is the difference between the total volumes of insider purchases and the total volume of sales, 
scaled by the total insider trading volume in the same quarter. ∆NPV_Q(X) is the difference of NPR at the Xth in the 
year after (before if X is negative) receiving FGCO and the average NPR at Xth quarter in the previous four years. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Logit(CHG_AUDITOR = 1) 
 All FIRMS GCOW GCOC 
∆BSSI_Q1 0.030 
(0.24) 
0.189 
(1.03) 
-0.269 
(-1.23) 
    
∆BSSI_Q2 -0.215 
(-1.61) 
-0.294 
(-1.40) 
-0.273 
(-1.37) 
    
∆BSSI_Q3 0.385*** 
(3.11) 
0.428** 
(2.28) 
0.394* 
(1.87) 
    
∆BSSI_Q4 -0.010 
(-0.07) 
-0.034 
(-0.14) 
-0.010 
(-0.04) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 537 247 290 
R2 0.121 0..205 0.154 
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Appendix A1. Descriptive Statistics for the Subsample 
Panel A reports the data processing steps. Panel B report the data processing for our sample construction. the 
descriptive statistics for the period from 2000-2007 by replicating Chen et al (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015). NPV 
is the net purchase ratio for insiders, which is measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the absolute total dollar 
amount of net insider trading (in thousands) over a fiscal year, with a positive (negative) sign added for net 
purchases (net sales) 
Panel A: Sample construction 
Steps Database Matching Criterion # of Obs  Decrease 
# of 
Firms 
1 Audit Analytics 
Initial number of first-time GCO firms during fiscal year 
end from 1999-2015   9968 
     
2 Edgar 
Delete first-time GCOs which are misidentified by the 
Audit Analytics database after checking with Edgar 
(occurred before 1999) 
-1171 8797 
     
3 Compustat Delete first-time GCO firms which not matched with the Compustat database based on CIK  -5864 2933 
     
4 CRSP Delete first-time GCO firms that do not survive after one year -1476 1042 
Missing data cleaning 
5 Audit Analytics No subsequent audit report available -379 663 
6 Compustat Missing accounting data during the year receiving FGCO -126 537 
Panel B: Subsample descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std. p25 Median p75 
NPV 765 -87.73 2030.79 0.000 0.000 47.40 
SIZE  763 3.973 1.648 2.683 3.745 4.979 
BM 751 0.575 1.718 0.073 0.465 1.164 
RET 684 -0.438 0.543 -0.840 -0.600 -0.202 
LOSS 762 0.940 0.238 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R&D 763 0.548 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
INVEST 762 0.219 0.252 0.028 0.107 0.328 
LEV 762 0.680 0.383 0.396 0.661 0.883 
CHG_LEV 743 0.684 1.385 0.023 0.273 0.853 
OCF 757 -0.368 0.481 -0.638 -0.173 0.004 
ZSCORE 721 2.873 3.712 0.365 1.993 4.772 
ANNLAG 761 4.336 0.371 4.127 4.489 4.654 
BIG4 765 0.641 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000 
NEW_FIN 758 0.722 0.448 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AGE 765 2.145 0.717 1.792 2.079 2.565 
Chen et al. (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015) constructed their samples based on the first 3 steps plus step 6 as in Panel 
A. They kept firms without insider trading as well as firms do not survive in one year in their samples. In order to 
valid the appropriateness of our sample. We further report the descriptive statistics of the subsample for the period 
from 2000-2007 as per Chen et al. (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015). In line with the literature, we add back those 
firms do not have an available audit report in the subsequent period after FGCO and do not have return data available 
in 240 trading days. We retain 765 and 634 first-time GCO (FGCO) firms for the unbalanced and balanced samples 
during this period, respectively. These numbers are very close to 801 firms in Chen et al. (2013)’s paper, and 707 firms 
in Dhaliwal et al. (2015)’s paper. In addition, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) report that during 2000-2007, the net purchase 
value (NPV) associated with top insiders was about -50. We report -87.73 for NPV of corporate insiders (including 
top insiders and other directors and officers). Other descriptive statistics are not comparable directly because their 
papers consider both FGCO and financial distressed firms. However, one important statistical point we can notice is 
that we have worse firm performance than those in Chen et al (2013) and Dhaliwal et al (2015). For instance, firms in 
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our sample have lower return (-0.438 vs 0.023 vs 0.029) and short- and long-term investment ratio (0.219 vs 0.278 vs 
0.284), worse operating cash flow (-0.368 vs -0.108 vs -0.103) and are more likely to have a negative net income (0.940 
vs 0.869 vs 0.896). These differences are due to the mitigation effect causing by the introduction of financial distressed 
firms in the sample. By nature, financial distressed firms should have relative better financial performance than GCO 
firms.  
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Appendix A2: Variable Definitions 
Variable 
Name 
 Definition 
GCOW  going concern opinion withdrawal 
GCOC  going concern opinion continuing 
SIZE  natural log value of total assets 
BM  book to market ratio 
RET  past annual stock return 
LOSS  an indicator variable equals to 1 if the net income is negative, otherwise 0 
R&D  an indicator variable equals to 1 if the research and development expenditure is greater than 0, otherwise 0 
INVEST  long and short-term investments scaled by total assets 
LEV  total liabilities to total assets ratio 
OCF  operating cash flow scaled by total assets 
ZSCORE  probability of bankruptcy score based on Zmijewski (1984) 
ANNLAG  the natural log value of the difference between earnings announcement date and the corresponding fiscal year end date 
NEWFIN  an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has a new issuance of debt or equity during the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise 
AGE  firm age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm recorded in the Compustat database plus 1 
BIG4  an indicator variable equals to 1 if the auditors are Big 4 accounting firms, 0 otherwise 
BHAR  market adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns, calculated as tock return minus market return, and then compounding over time 
BSFI  the number of purchases less the number of sales scaled by the total number of trades for each firm quarter 
BSSI  the total number of shares bought less the total number of shares sold scaled by the total insider trading volume for each firm quarter 
BUY  an indicator variable if both BSFI and BSSI are greater than 0 
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Appendix A3: Cited Reasons in Going Concern Opinion 
Category 1 includes issues related to poor financial performance such as present or recurring losses, negative cash flows 
or poor working capital. Category 2 indicates issues regarding financing problems like debt defaults, debt covenant 
violations, loss of credit facilities, or the need for, or problems in securing, additional financing. Category 3 is for 
operating issues including reference to loss of a key customer, problems with suppliers, or business combine nation. 
Category 4 is other issues. 
Issue  Category 
Absence of significant revenues  1 
Accumulated/retained earnings deficit  1 
Assets – inadequate, limited, immaterial or impaired  1 
Bankruptcy  4 
Benefit Plan, Pension, etc. - Obligations  3 
Changed industry or business  3 
Compensation deferred  4 
Competitor threat  3 
Credit line reduced, unavailable or due  2 
Credit quality deterioration  2 
Debt covenants/agreements uncertain or not in compliance  2 
Debt is substantial  2 
Decline in revenue  1 
Derivatives - obligations, losses  1 
Development stage  3 
Discontinued/Disposal of Operations  3 
Exploration/Pre-exploration Stage  3 
Gross margin – negative  1 
Initial loss  1 
Insufficient / limited cash, capital or liquidity concerns  1 
Liabilities exceed assets  1 
Liquidation of assets  1 
Litigation contingencies  4 
Need for additional financing for funding obligations and/or servicing debt  2 
Need for additional financing for growth or to meet business objectives  2 
Need for additional financing to sustain operations  2 
Negative cash flow from operations  1 
Net losses since inception  1 
Net/Operating Loss (including recurring losses)  1 
No dividends  4 
No Marketable Product(s)  3 
Not commenced, limited or no operations  3 
Notes Payable/Debt - Default, Due, delinquency  2 
Product demand or pricing - decline or limited  3 
Profitability concerns  1 
Recoverability of (natural) resources - uncertain  4 
Refinancing contingencies  2 
Regulatory capital - decline or deficiency  4 
Regulatory settlements, obligations and contingencies  4 
Restructuring contingencies  3 
Seeking or needs to combine with existing company  3 
Stock/share Option Exercise Risk(s)  1 
Stockholder equity or partner capital - deficiency or decrease  1 
Subsidiary - spin off  3 
Vendor-supplier disputes or disruptions  3 
Working capital/current ratio deficit/inadequacy  1 
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